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Abstract
We consider players that have very limited knowledge about their own val-
uations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player i has about
the profile of true valuations, θ∗, consists of a set of distributions, from one of
which θ∗i has been drawn.
We prove a “robustness” theorem for Knightian players in single-parameter
domains: every mechanism that is weakly dominant-strategy truthful for clas-
sical players continues to be well-behaved for Knightian players that choose
undominated strategies.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
64
11
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
5 M
ar 
20
14
1 Introduction
In [CMZ14] we motivate the problem of mechanism design for Knightian players,
and prove that (1) dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-good and multi-unit
auctions cannot provide good social-welfare efficiency, but (2) the second-price and
Vickrey mechanisms deliver good social-welfare performance, for these two settings,
in undominated strategies.
In this report, we prove a “robustness” theorem for single-parameter domains.
Namely, consider a mechanism M for a single-parameter domain and suppose that
M , when players have perfect information about their own valuations, is weakly
dominant-strategy truthful. Now consider the same mechanism M , but with Knigh-
tian players that, not having any dominant strategy to play, choose to play undom-
inated strategies. We prove that the set of undominated strategies is well-behaved,
in the sense that these strategies do not deviate from the players’ approximate infor-
mation about his own valuation.
2 Model
In a classical single-parameter domain, there is a set A, the set of all possible alloca-
tions; for each player i there exists a publicly known subset Si ⊆ A; and the set of
possible valuations for player i, Θi, consists of all functions mapping A to the reals,
subject to the following constraints: for each θi ∈ Θi,
(1) θi(x) = 0 ∀x 6∈ Si and
(2) θi(x) = θi(y) ∀x, y ∈ Si.
We denote the true valuation of player i by θ∗i .
(The term “single-parameter” derives from the fact that each θi ∈ Θi coincides
with a single number: i’s value for, say, the lexicographically first element of Si. The
term “classical” emphasizes that each player knows exactly his own true valuation.)
The set of possible outcomes is Ω
def
= A×Rn≥0. If (A,P ) ∈ Ω, we refer Pi as the price
charged to player i. We assume quasi-linear utilities. That is, the utility function Ui
of a player i maps a valuation θi and an outcome ω = (A,P ) to Ui(θi, ω)
def
= θi(A)−Pi.
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If ω is a distribution over outcomes, we also denote by Ui(θi, ω) the expected
utility of player i.
Single-parameter domains are general enough to include several settings of inter-
est: in particular, provision of a public good1 [Cla71], bilateral trades [MS83], and
buying a path in a network [NR01].
2.1 Knightian Valuation Uncertainty
In our model, a player i’s sole information about θ∗ consists of Ki, a set of distributions
over Θi, from one of which θ
∗
i has been drawn. (The true valuations are uncorrelated.)
That is, Ki is i’s sole (and private) information about his own true valuation θ∗i .
Furthermore, for every opponent j, i has no information (or beliefs) about θ∗j or Kj.
Given that all he cares about is his expected (quasi-linear) utility, a player i may
‘collapse’ each distribution Di ∈ Ki to its expectation Eθi∼Di [θi].2 Therefore, for
single-parameter domains, a mathematically equivalent formulation of the Knightian
valuation model is the following:
Definition 2.1 (Knightian valuation model). For each player i, i’s sole information
about θ∗ is a set Ki, the candidate (valuation) set of i, such that θ∗i ∈ Ki ⊂ Θi.
We refer to an element of Ki as a candidate valuation.
In Knightian valuation model, a mechanism’s performance will of course depend on
the inaccuracy of the players’ candidate sets, which we measure as follows.
Definition 2.2. Let K⊥i
def
= inf Ki and K
>
i
def
= supKi.
The candidate set Ki of a player i is (at most) δ-approximate if K
>
i −K⊥i ≤ δ.
A single-parameter domain is (at most) δ-approximate if each Ki is δ-approximate.
1Indeed, in the provision of a public good, A has just two elements, a (i.e., the good is provided),
which different players may value differently, and b (i.e., the good is not provided), which all players
value 0.
2Whatever the auction mechanism used, this equivalence holds for any auction where each Θi is
a convex set. In particular, this includes unrestricted combinatorial auctions of m distinct goods.
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2.2 Social Welfare, Mechanisms, and Knightian Dominance
Social welfare. The social welfare of an allocation A ∈ A, SW(A), is defined to be∑
i θ
∗
i (A); and the maximum social welfare, MSW, is defined to be maxA∈A SW(A).
(That is, SW and MSW continue to be defined relative to the players’ true valuations
θ∗i , whether or not the players know them exactly.)
More generally, the social welfare of an allocation A relative to a valuation profile
θ, SW(θ, A), is
∑
i θi(A); and the maximum social welfare relative to θ, MSW(θ), is
maxA∈A SW(θ, A). Thus, SW(A) = SW(θ∗, A) and MSW = MSW(θ∗).
General mechanisms and strategies. A mechanism M specifies, for each player i,
a set Si. We interchangeably refer to each member of Si as a pure strategy/action/report
of i, and similarly, a member of ∆(Si) a mixed strategy/action/report of i.
After each player i, simultaneously with his opponents, reports a strategy si in
Si, M maps the reported strategy profile s to an outcome M(s) ∈ Ω.
IfM is probabilistic, thenM(s) ∈ ∆(Ω). Thus, as per our notation, Ui(θi,M(s)) def=
Eω∼M(s)[Ui(θi, ω)] for each player i.
Note that Si = Θi for the direct mechanisms in the classical setting, but may be
arbitrary in general.
Knightian undominated strategies. Given a mechanism M , a pure strategy si of
a player i with a candidate set Ki is (weakly) undominated, in symbols si ∈ UDi(Ki),
if i does not have another (possibly mixed) strategy σi such that
(1) ∀θi ∈ Ki ∀s−i ∈ S−i EUi
(
θi,M(σi, s−i)
) ≥ Ui(θi,M(si, s−i)), and
(2) ∃θi ∈ Ki ∃s−i ∈ S−i EUi
(
θi,M(σi, s−i)
)
> Ui
(
θi,M(si, s−i)
)
.
If K is a product or a profile of candidate sets, that is, if K = (K1, . . . , Kn) or
K = K1 × · · · ×Kn, then UD(K) def= UD1(K1)× · · · × UDn(Kn).
Note that the above notion of an undominated strategy is a natural extension of
its classical counterpart, but other extensions are possible.
Weakly dominant-strategy truthfulness in classical settings. Finally, let us
recall what it means for a mechanism M to be weakly dominant-strategy truthful
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(weakly DST) when every player i knows θ∗i exactly. Namely, for each player i:
(0) Si = Θi
(1) ∀vi ∈ Θi ∀v′i ∈ Θi ∀v−i ∈ Θ−i Ui
(
vi,M(vi, v−i)
) ≥ Ui(vi,M(v′i, v−i))
(2) ∀vi ∈ Θi ∀v′i ∈ Θi \ {vi} ∃v−i ∈ Θ−i Ui
(
vi,M(vi, v−i)
)
> Ui
(
vi,M(v
′
i, v−i)
)
.
(For comparison, the notion of a DST mechanism omits the last condition above.)
3 Result
We prove the Knightian robustness of many mechanisms at once as follows.
Theorem 1. Let M be a weakly dominant-strategy truthful mechanism for classical
single-parameter domains. Then, in this domain with Knightian valuation uncer-
tainty, for every player i, UD(Ki) ⊆
[
K⊥i , K
>
i
]
.
Discussion. The above theorem implies that the behavior of (weakly dominant-
strategy truthful) mechanisms in a δ-approximate single-parameter domains grace-
fully degrades with δ. In particular, it implies that, when applied to the provision of
a public good in the presence of n Knightian players, the VCG mechanism guaran-
tees, in undominated strategies, a social welfare ≥ MSW− 2nδ. As another example,
when applied to buying paths in a network, the VCG mechanism guarantees a social
welfare ≥ MSW − 2mδ, where m is the number of edges in the network. Finally,
we note that the proof of Theorem 1 easily extends to imply an analogous result for
the VCG mechanism for single-minded combinatorial auctions, which are not quite
single-parameter domains.3
More generally, Theorem 1 implies that, for all weakly dominant-strategy mecha-
nisms M (which include those of [Cla71, MS83, NR01])
‘the outcome M(v) is sufficiently good
whenever maxi |vi − θ∗i | is sufficiently small for all i and θ∗i ∈ Ki’.
3In such an auction, there are m distinct goods, and each player i values, positively and for the
same amount θ∗i , only the supersets of a given subset Si of the goods. This auction is not single-
parameter because Si is private, that is, known solely to i. Accordingly, i’s true valuation can be
fully described only by the number θ∗i and the subset Si. The VCG mechanism for single-minded
auctions ensures, in undominated strategies, a social welfare that is at least MSW − 2 min{n,m}δ.
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Proof. The theorem is obvious when Ki = {θ∗i } is a singleton: since reporting
the truth is a weakly dominant strategy, it dominates all other strategies so that
UD(Ki) = {θ∗i } must also be a singleton. For the rest of the proof we assume that Ki
has at least two distinct valuations.
We begin by recalling the following fact about dominant-strategy truthful mech-
anisms in single-parameter domains where each player perfectly knows his own true
valuation [AT01]:
Let M be a mechanism for a single-parameter domain, and let fi(v) ∈ [0, 1]
be the probability that the allocation chosen by M , under strategy profile v,
is in player i’s set Si. Then, M is dominant-strategy truthful if and only if
(a) f is monotonically non-decreasing, i.e., fi(vi, v−i) ≤ fi(v′i, v−i) whenever
vi ≤ v′i, and (b) player i’s expected price on input v, denoted by pi(v), equals
to vi · fi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0
fi(z, v−i) dz.
Having recalled the above fact, we now prove that, for any Knightian player i with
candidate set Ki = [K
⊥
i , K
>
i ],
vi ∈ UDi(Ki) =⇒ vi ∈ [K⊥i , K>i ].
Let v⊥i
def
= K⊥i and v
>
i
def
= K>i , and consider any strategy vi ∈ UDi(Ki). If vi ∈ Ki =
[v⊥i , v
>
i ] then we are done. Otherwise, suppose that vi < v
⊥
i . (The other case, vi > v
>
i ,
can be shown analogously.)
We first claim that, for player i, reporting v⊥i is no worse than reporting vi. Indeed,
fixing any (pure) strategy sup-profile v−i for the other players and any possible true
valuation θi ∈ Ki, and letting v⊥ = (v⊥i , v−i) and v = (vi, v−i), we compute that
E
[
Ui
(
θi,M(v
⊥)
)]− E[Ui(θi,M(v))]
=
(
fi(v
⊥)− fi(v)
) · θi − (pi(v⊥)− pi(v))
=
(
fi(v
⊥)− fi(v)
) · θi −(v⊥i · fi(v⊥)− ∫ v⊥i
0
fi(z, v−i) dz − vi · fi(v) +
∫ vi
0
fi(z, v−i) dz
)
=
(
fi(v
⊥)− fi(v)
) · (θi − v⊥i ) + ∫ v⊥i
vi
(
fi(z, v−i)− fi(v)
)
dz .
Now note that θi ∈ Ki implies that θi − v⊥i = θi − K⊥i ≥ 0. Moreover, by the
monotonicity of f , whenever z ≥ vi, it holds that fi(z, v−i) ≥ fi(v). Therefore we
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deduce that the above difference is greater than or equal to zero. We conclude that
reporting v⊥i is no worse than reporting vi.
Next there are two subcases. If E
[
Ui
(
θi,M(v
⊥)
)] − E[Ui(θi,M(v))] equals to
zero for all θi ∈ Ki and for all v−i, then, using the fact that Ki has at least two
distinct valuations, we conclude that for i, the allocation probability and (expected)
price in outcomes M(vi, v−i) and M(v⊥i , v−i) are the same, independent of v−i. This
contradicts the fact that M is weakly dominant-strategy truthful in the classical
setting, since Ui(vi,M(vi, v−i)) must be strictly greater than Ui(vi,M(v⊥i , v−i)) at
least for some v−i.
Otherwise, if there exist some θ∗i and some v
∗
−i that make the difference E
[
Ui
(
θi,M(v
⊥)
)]−
E
[
Ui
(
θi,M(v)
)]
non-zero, it must follow that the difference is strictly positive. For
such θ∗i and v
∗
−i, reporting v
⊥
i is therefore strictly better than reporting vi, so by defi-
nition v⊥i weakly dominates vi for player i, leading to a contradiction to vi ∈ UDi(Ki).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. 
References
[AT01] Aaron Archer and E´va Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter
agents. In Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE 42nd Annual Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science, FOCS ’01, pages 482–491. IEEE Computer
Society, 2001.
[Cla71] Edward H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17–
33, 1971.
[CMZ14] Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, and Zeyuan Allen Zhu. Knightian ro-
bustness of the Vickrey mechanism. ArXiv e-prints, abs/xxxx.xxxx, March
2014. to appear.
[MS83] Roger B Myerson and Mark A Satterthwaite. Efficient mechanisms for
bilateral trading. Journal of economic theory, 29(2):265–281, 1983.
[NR01] Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and
Economic Behavior, 35:166–196, 2001.
6
